Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires certain states with a history of discrimination to apply to the federal government for “pre-clearance” before making changes to their voting procedures, was in front of the Supreme Court this week, as a county in Alabama argued that the goals of the act had been accomplished and that the requirements now unfairly singled out states that have long remedied the sins of their fathers. The conservative wing of the court has had it in for Section 5 for years, holding that the formula by which covered districts are determined is outdated, and by the looks of it they may finally get their target. The provision, Justice Scalia mused, amounts to a “perpetuation of racial entitlement” — to which Justice Sotomayor later responded, “Do you think that the right to vote is a racial entitlement?”
While the Sotomayor and the other liberal justices defended the act as necessary and pointed to its overhelming reauthorization by Congress — the Senate vote was 98-0 — just six years ago, Scalia made a ridiculous argument that ran completely counter to his legacy of railing against judicial activism. Despite the lip service that the “strict constitutionalist” pays to deference to the legislative branch, he pushed the court to intervene because the senators who voted in favor may not have really meant it. “This is not the kind of a question you can leave to Congress,” he said. This exchange with Justice Elana Kagan captures the extent to which Scalia is willing to step on legislative toes:
Kagan: It was clear to 98 senators, including every senator from a covered state, who decided that there was a continuing need for this piece of legislation.
Scalia: Or decided that perhaps they’d better not vote against, that there’s . . .none of their interests in voting against it. I don’t think there is anything to be gained by any senator to vote against continuation of this act. . . . They are going to lose votes if they do not reenact the Voting Rights Act. Even the name of it is wonderful: the Voting Rights Act. Who is going to vote against that in the future?
Well, wouldn’t that invalidate every innocuously named piece of legislation, from the Orwellian PATRIOT Act to the Violence Against Women Act to any of the scads of Republican bills with the phrase “job creators” in the title? Woe to the member of Congress who introduces the No Eating Puppies bill. Scalia’s logic is particularly nonsensical given his own prior opinions, like this one from a 1995 speech that Politico dredged up to demonstrate the justice’s Cirque-de-Soleil-caliber backflip: “To talk of legislative intent is, from the outset, ridiculous.”
The Washington Post tears into Scalia in an editorial:
This is a stunning line of argumentation. Congress is empowered to write legislation enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. But if Justice Scalia doubts the purity of lawmakers’ motives, then apparently this power is limited. We wonder how the justice is able to discern what lay within the hearts of these 98 senators. We also wonder how many challenged acts of Congress would survive if the court saw fit to strike down any that were enacted by lawmakers considering, in part, their reelection prospects.
Liberal columnist Dana Milbank drags out the old (and, given the typical liberal enthusiasm for loose constitutional interpretation, purely opportunistic) complaint of judicial activism, writing that “Conservative jurists usually claim deference to the elected branches, but in this case they look an awful lot like activist judges legislating from the bench.” The New York Times editorializes that, “If the Supreme Court substitutes its judgment for Congress’s, it will enable state and local governments to erode nearly half a century of civil rights gains.” The funny thing is, the left is usually pretty comfortable with the courts substituting their judgment for Congress’s; see the NYT editorializing, in the context of the Defense of Marriage Act, that Congress’s will should be rejected as unconstitutional. (Incidentally, conservatives also see a contradiction between Obama’s previous position that marriage should be left to the states and the administration’s brief in another gay marriage case, in which it holds that states cannot bestow “everything but the name” rights on same-sex couples without permitting marriage. I’d say this “evolution,” as Obama might say, is admirable, and at any rate, his personal views were never a legal brief. The administration does not, as many Republicans claim, go as far as claiming a constitutional right to national same-sex marriage.) It’s not the idea of judicial activism that bothers liberals; it’s conservatives’ highly selective denunciation of it. They don’t necessarily object to the principle until they find it useful to invoke the right’s own arguments against it. Liberals easily forget that in countless other cases, activism is praised as advancing social justice. Hypocrisy is the issue here, they claim. Suddenly, deference to Congress — the same Congress that can’t be trusted with other civil rights matters, like DOMA — is of utmost importance. Writes the New York Times, “We hope the justices recognize the broader truth that the Constitution does not tolerate denying gay people the right to wed in any state.”
For both sides, then, judicial activism is simply code for decisions they don’t like. When the ruling works in either side’s favor, the court is merely enforcing the Constitution, not legislating from the bench. When the Affordable Care Act was before the court, conservatives argued that “A court is doing its duty, not legislating, when it strikes down an unconstitutional law.” In the latest case, National Review purports that it’s “hardly judicial activism” to overturn a section of the Voting Rights Act it sees as based on outdated statistical and demographic information that Congress failed to update for the 2006 renewal.
So, in reauthorizing Section 5 in 2006, Congress exceeded its constitutional authority. Striking it down would honor the Constitution’s text. Indeed, upholding it would mean ignoring constitutional text and would thus be true judicial activism.
Another post on the NR blog consists solely of “Reminder: it’s not judicial activism when the law is unconstitutional.”
Doesn’t that beg the question? The debate is not about whether courts can overturn unconstitutional laws; even conservatives who rail against unrestrained, unelected judges would agree as much. The debate, rather, is about whether it’s unconstitutional to treat states differently in pursuit of a patently constitutional goal: carrying out the 14th and 15th Amendments. The provision’s constitutionality is where you must start your argument, not end it. It’s funny how neatly NR’s definition of “unconstitutional” tracks with “everything conservatives dislike.” Overturning a law despised by the right is never judicial activism, but any ruling that disturbs its pet causes, like forcing women to carry unwanted pregnancies to term, automatically fits the bill. Ergo, overturning DOMA would be judicial activism, a hideous usurpation of the power of Congress to protect the valuable institution of child-producing marriage, but overturning Section 5 would just be respecting the Constitution. Despite the fact that the constitutionality of both laws hinges on an alleged violation of equal protection – unjustly treating one class of people (gays) or one subset of states (the South) differently from another – the court should in one case defer to the wishes of Congress and in another take matters into its own hands, as the issue is too important to leave up to mere mortals.
The knife cuts both ways, of course, as liberals would also like to see one law (DOMA) overturned and the other (Section 5) upheld. Though judicial activism has historically supported the liberal goals of equality social justice, from the civil-rights era decisions of the Warren court to rulings on defendants’ rights, the court’s rightward slide under Rehnquist and Roberts means the shoe is suddenly on the other foot. Unlike conservatives, they at least don’t noisily decry the practice until it’s advantageous to embrace it, though they do generally accept it until they can use it as a cudgel against opponents. Thus Dana Milbank, who probably doesn’t have a problem with the court making hash of laws he dislikes, can suddenly cite deference to Congress as a virtue. The left is less bothered by judicial activism itself than by conservative flip-flops on its merits. That’s why the entire cry of “judicial activism” itself is so tired and useless; it’s only applied to judicial acts each side disagrees with. Better to debate the case on its merits, where I believe the left has the better case. While I’m sympathetic to the narrower objection that the formula by which the areas required to apply for pre-clearance are determined hasn’t been updated since the 1972, sending Section 5 back to Congress for revision would, in this age of gridlock, be tantamount to killing off the provision altogether. Scalia may be right that members of Congress are loath to take a stand against something as iconic as the Voting Rights Act, but they would have little compunction about letting an update to an obscure provision languish permanently in committee. Without the higher standard of pre-clearance, which puts the burden on the state to defend its voting procedures against charges of discriminatory effects, plaintiffs would be forced to demonstrate that the state’s changes were intended to disadvantage minorities — a harder bar to clear, and a prohibitively expensive one in terms of lawsuits. The effect would be to leave voters in previously covered states without protection just as conservatives are ramping up the voter ID laws and roll-purges that began in 2012.
Some on the left — New York Times columnist Charles Blow, the editors at Bloomberg View — have advanced the unlikely scenario of a reworking of Section 5 that would eliminate its disparate impact on Southern states not by killing the provision but by expanding it to cover the entire country. As Bloomberg points out, some of the worst voter suppression tactics of the 2012 election occurred in Pennsylvania, which is not subject to the pre-clearance requirement. Write the editors:
[T]he court could take a more universal view of voting rights, including but not limited to the issue of racial discrimination. Problems with registration procedures, poorly trained poll workers, inadequate voting hours, accessibility and other factors impede voting for millions of Americans across many states. Some of these problems may be rooted in racial discrimination. Many others are not. All have the effect of undermining the right to vote . . . .
So maybe the question isn’t whether it’s time to end the federal government’s special oversight of the South. It’s how to extend that level of attention to the whole country.
This would address Justice Roberts’ pointed questioning, during oral arguments, whether it is “the government’s submission that the citizens in the South are more racist than the citizens in the North?” as well as his previous concern, during a similar case in 2009, that the 35-year-old coverage formula has led to a country in which “the evil that Section 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for pre-clearance.” Charles Blow notes that much has changed since the 1960s, when blacks were the largest minority group; today, Hispanics and Asians make up a growing portion of the electorate, and are obviously “geographically dispersed differently.” Blow writes that “We not only need to keep Section 5 in place, we also need to consider expanding it so that every voter has fair and equal access to the ballot.”
My knowledge of the technical and legal matters at stake in the latest case (officially, Shelby v. Holder) is admittedly thin, but at least the logic of the left seems more internally consistent than the flip-flopping on what constitutes “activism” by the right. I see a common thread, not a contradiction, in the liberal positions on civil rights and gay marriage. By rejecting DOMA and preserving Section 5, the court protects citizens against discrimination, and protecting the rights of gay couples and minorities to be treated fairly takes precedence over protecting the “rights” of states to be treated identically despite their divergent histories of poll taxes and racially-motivated redistricting. Conservatives, on the other hand, would argue that, though the court should have no role in protecting individuals from discrimination, it should nevertheless step in and protect states from discrimination. Suddenly, the GOP has found an equal-rights policy it can get behind! If corporations are people in the Republican worldview, perhaps states are better than people.
When the Supreme Court hands down its ruling, one side will undoubtedly applaud the justices for respecting the Constitution, whether it demonstrates that respect via judicial activism or judicial restraint. A country that divided closely down the middle in November 2012 responds in similar fashion to any political act — and every Supreme Court decision, despite John Roberts’ insistence that “umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them . . . it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not pitch or bat,” is inherently a political act. Scalia is hardly playing the role of a neutral umpire when he speaks of “racial entitlement,” and Sotomayor is equally as opinionated when she essentially argues the government’s brief better than the solicitor general himself. What the court decides, and how Congress reacts, will determine how many safeguards remain for the ultimate political issue: the right to vote.






















