“The Double Game” (The New Yorker)
Mostly I agree with all the pundits, analysts and “unnamed officials” who argue that the situation in Pakistan has left the U.S. between a rock and a hard spot. The cheek with which the country’s military and civilian leaders dismiss the Bin Laden raid as an illegal violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty is highly annoying. Twenty billion in aid since 9/11, and this is the thanks we get? The jingoist in me sees such temerity as an affront; does Pakistan really think it has a choice in the matter? But the fact is that it does have a choice. It can keep supporting, via the ISI, militant groups and al Qaeda fighters.
I’d like to think that the U.S. has a choice, too: the choice to cut off aid, to tell the Pakistanis exactly where they can stick their sovereignty. After all, I’m not even entirely convinced that a bunch of jihadists in Afghanistan and Pakistan really still pose a terrorist threat. If we pull out of Afghanistan, would the chance of another attack skyrocket? It’s hard to know, bellicose rhetoric aside, just how dedicated terrorist groups are to destroying America, especially considering the tides of the Arab Spring are lapping against closer shores. The chance of Pakistan dropping a nuclear bomb on India seems remote, though the other nuclear danger, the dispersal of bomb-making materials to groups of radicals, seems more plausible.
That said, I can see why the Obama administration feels damned if it does, damned if it doesn’t. We can’t very well abandon the effort in Pakistan — there are nukes, al Qaeda and its various offshoots, the influence on neighboring Afghanistan — but it’s hard to stomach continuing to allow the Pakistanis to play both sides. An article in the May 16 issue of The New Yorker, by Lawrence Wright, offered the first credible alternative I’ve seen:
Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Many Pakistanis are in favor of less U.S. aid; their slogan is “trade not aid.” In particular, Pakistani businessmen have long sought U.S. tax breaks for their textiles, which American manufacturers have resisted. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class. India would no doubt welcome a reduction in military aid to Pakistan, and the U.S. could use this as leverage to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to vote on their future, which would very likely be a vote for independence. These two actions might do far more to enhance Pakistan’s stability, and to insure its friendship, than the billions of dollars that America now pays like a ransom.
The India-Pakistan rivalry has always seemed to me to be part of the problem; Wright’s genius is in making it part of the solution. While the military establishment in Pakistan is so strong and entrenched that I am not convinced reducing aid would empower the civilian government, making the president and prime minister more than mere figureheads is not an un-worthwhile mission. More may have to be done to accomplish it than simply slashing military aid, but in his consideration of the bigger picture in the Pakistan-Afghanistan-India morass, Wright is definitely on the right track.
. . . So Well Read. . . 